" Tne desrre of both sides of industry to provide for, and to operate an effective system rs a stronger guarantee of industnat peace and of a smooth function of labour-management relations than any action legislators or Courts or enforcement officers can ever hope to undertake." 2 Such warnmgs do not, however. deter legislators and polrtrcians from invoking law as a maJor means of establishmg and marntarnmg a greater degree of stability and peace rn mdustrial life. In movmg the second reading of the 1976 Industrial Relations Amendment Bill (No. 3) (whrch contained many new restrictrons on strike action) a New Zealand Cabinet Minrster claimed that law must ·act as a deterrent to those bent on recalcrtrant or destructive action ."
Srmllarly, the Presrdent of the United Kmgdom Natrona! Industrial Relations Court had thrs to say in 1972 when fining the Transport and General Workers Union £55,000 :
"Without the rule of law and Courts to enforce it, each one of us would be free to push and bully our fellow citizens and, which may be thought more important) our fellow citizens would be free to push and bully us . In a fre&-for-all none of us would hope to be the wrnner The JUStification for law, the Courts and the nule of law is that they protect us from unfarr and oppressrve actrons by others; but If we are to have that protection we must ourselves accept that the law applies to us, too , and limits our freedom.
In civrlised countries nearly everyone accepts thrs and agrees that Is a small price to pay. There remain the few who want to use the laws which suit them and disobey those which do not. If the rule of law is to have any meanrng , the Courts must In the last resort take actron against these few end rmpose some penalty " 3
The fining of, and imposition of lnjunc· lions on, trade unions and their leaders has brought into sharp focus the conflict which exists between the philosophy that all must obey the law (and that unions In particular are not above the law) and the view that the protagonists of labour relations should be left alone to reach their own solutions by way of negotiatron, mediation and collective bargaining There have been any number of instances in recent years, not only in the United Kingdom but also in Australia, New Zealand and other countries, where there has been resrstance by unions to the enforcement of Court orders aga1nst them. where union off1c1als have been Imprisoned as a consequence and where Widespread strike action has resulted or been threatened In each instance, Government intervention has normally followed and an explosive situation defused by means of a conciliated settlement of the original dispute or by the setting up of ad hoc machinery for resolv· mg the dispute.
It Is tempting to conclude from these Instances that law Is at worst harmful and at best Irrelevant in the field of Industrial relations. More than sixty·f1ve years ago, the great philosopher Ehrlich in fact warn· ed that legal rules and Court decisions had no substantial efficacy on the conduct of workers "Law suit and compulsory execution are to (the worker) little more than mere words,' he said, compared with the non-legal norms of the workplace which dictate his behaviour and conduct. Accordmg to Ehrlich, the fear of dismissal and unemployment, the desire for promotion and, most Importantly, h1s affiliation to his fellow workers (especially through the medium of a trade union) prov1de the true explanation of his willingness to cont1nue at his workplace and the manner in which he does sa.
• One of the difficulties w1th the debate about the role of law In labour relations is that it is overly simplistic. Views become polarised on all fronts. I suspect that the views of those who claim to be opponents of legal regulation are strongly coloured oy the Injunction or penalty cases. Their horizons probably do not extend beyond these instances. Thus they will not for example have in mind the fact that In most countries it has proved necessary to enact factories and machinery legislation for the safety of workers These were matters that were originally the subject of negotiation between unions and employers but the problems surrounding the settlement of such Issues in that manner ultimately led to State intervention and the assumpt10n of Governmental responsibility for ensurIng that adequate standards were attained by employers. The means adopted was law On the other nand. those who clamour for law, or more law, often fail to distln gulsh between law as enacted on the statute book and Its elf1cacy as Implemented. Too often Industrial taws have been 98 enacted wh1ch are Ignored and forgotten and which therefore only serve to create an unhealthy void between the theoretical system and that wh1ch operates 10 practice Law does not of course permeate or regulate all Industrial relat1ons act1v1hes When the industnal relations f1eld is viewed as a whole, it will be seen that there are a number of areas of employer-employee relations which have been regulated or determined by quite dtfferent means. Broadly speaking, there are for example matters which have traditionally been the subject of collective bargain1ng between unions and employers, wtth little or comparatively little legal direction Thus, at least until recent times, wage rates tended to be fixed by bargaining and negotiation with little external influence other than that of rates fixed in a s1mHar manner in other mdustnes. Conditions of employment relatmg to such matters as entitlement to sick pay, travelling allowances and so forlh were also treated 1n this way There are other areas where the Jaw has also been largely reticent but which have not been the subject of collective bargainrng. These Include such matters of employer or company policy as to what will be produced or manufactured and how it will be marketed. the establishment :>f systems of work. the allocation of work and so forth. These (and others like them) have traditionally been regarded as falling withm the general rubnc of employer or managerial prerogative It is the purpose of this paper to show that 1n recent years qu1te dramat1c changes have become evident in the customary handling of 1ndustnal relations matters In particular, disputes and claims that were formerly the subrect of collective bargaining between employers and unions have ncreasingly been taken out of that domain and made the subject of legal regulation Further and probably as a consequence of that development. unions have begun o lay claim to ereas of managerial prerog· at1ve and to asserl a right to bargain over m21tters that were previously regarded as bemg outside theJr junsdiction But these lso are areas where developments 11"' 1 legal regulation already threaten to overlake the Incipient and tardy attempts by the trade umons to assert bargaining rights. In describmg and tracing these recent developments, particular attention will be patd in this paper to the situation In New Zealand but, where appropriate, reference wtll be made also to the expenence of other countnes
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW ZEALAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
lndustnal Relations 1n New Zealand has throughout thts century been characterised by a highly developed legal system regulating collective disputes
In the early 1890's the trade untons of the country had taken a fearful hammenng from the employf!rs in a manttme dtspute which had started in New South Wales and spread to New Zealand As a direct result of the crushing vtctory enjoyed by the employers. there were considerable fears by the Liberal Government of the ttme that the way would be open for more unscrupulous employers to explott the situation and take advantage of the dtsarray and weak positton tn whtch the untons found themselves As a direct result, the first of the Industrial Conciliatton and Arb1trat10n Acts was passed in 1894
That Act established a central Arbitration Court with wide powers to settle disputes that arose between employers and unions and also to lay down in the form of awards minimum wage rates and basic conditions of employment which were to operate in a parttcular industry where the employer or employers on the one hand and the union or unions on the other hand were unable to reach an agreement by way of collecttve bargaining. In addttton, the legislation enacted legal procedures by which collecttve bargaining was to take place under the chairmanship of an independent concilIator wherever employers and workers were unable to reach an immediate agreement.
Wtth various ups and downs, the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration legislation operated fairly effectively from that time until the late 1960's. A number of important amendments were made to the Acts from t1me to time. mcludtng a requirement first enacted in the 1930's that workers In nn mdustry . covered by an award settled by the Arbttratton Court or by a collective agreement registered wtth the Registrar of the Court were reqUired to toin the trade unton whtch was a party to that award or agreement In 1973, the legislation was consolidated and re-enacted wi th modifications as the Industrial Relations Act 1973.
In the years smce the Second Wo rld War. industnal stnfe in New Zealand has emerged and spread Previously, there had been comparatively few Industrial stoppages and indeed at dtfferent ti mes New Zealand had been held up to the worl d as betng a nation that was vtrtually stri kefree. In 1951 a major stoppage on the waterfront had led to the National Government assumtng legal powers derived from national emergency leglslatt on w hich enabled the police and armed forces to crush the stnke and to remove key umon figures from thelf positions of office. The u nio ns retlfed, beaten by the power of the State, but tn the early part of the 1960's an tncreasing number of stoppages over dlsmtssals began to emerge. New Zealand dnfted Into a minor recession in 1967 and tn 1968 matters came to a head on the tndustrial front when the Arbitration Court accepted submissions from the Employe rs' Federatton and refused to make a cost of living indexatton award (in New Zealand called General Wage Order) on the grou nds that the economy could not bear suc h an mcrease. Industrial action whi c h resulted saw the joinln!J of forces between the Employers· Federation and the Federation of Labour in what was termed the "unholy alliance" by the then Minister of Finance. A joint apolication was made to the Court for an order notwithstanding the earlier rejection. The Court (which is a tripartite body consisting of a Judge and two laymembers nomineted respecttvely by the Employers' Federation and the Federation of Labour) this time granted a 5% General Wage Order by way of a majority decision, the Judge dissenting.
Thereafter. the Federation of Labour (still smarttng from the original nil ord er and the Judge's continued disse ntion) made it platn that It would have as little to do with the Court In any of its JUrisdictions as possible and would resort whereever possible to direct bargaining as a means of obtaining the. benefits that they sought or settling the dtsputes that arose. The next few years saw considerable confrontation between employers and unions and, certainly in the more militant lndustnes 1n parttcular, legal procedures were commonly by-passed and disputes and claims settled in accordance with the rela-live industrial strength of the parties In 1971 the National Government introduced into Parliament a Bill establishing a system of wage control restricting the tncreases which could be grven to award rates and to individual employees. A central Tribunal, known as the Stabilisation of Aemuneralton Authority, was established from which approval was required before any wage •ncrease could be given. That Bill was duly passed by Parltament but, tn accordance with rts terms. It expired 12 months later However. at that date further and similar wage controls were enacted by way of statutory regulation pursuant to general authonty given by the Econo~ic Stabilisation Act 1948 (which gave wrde powers to enact delegated legislation where necessary for the good of the economy) Those regulations remained in force, despite union opposition and pressure. until the National Government of the day wa removed from oH1ce in the General Elect1on at the end of 1972.
The incoming Labour Government at that time repealed the regulations and for a period of some months there were aga1n no direct controls over wage rates. This saw a time once more when the unions exerted their industrial strength and con· siderable gains were made by them in the form of large increases. Eventually, as Inflation began to bite. the Labour Government was forced to bnng down its own regulations restricting wage increases. It endeavoured however to provide a degree of flexibility (which in practice often worked inequitably) by allowing increases in certain exceptional cases to be passed on where approval was obtained from a central Tribunal
The situation at the moment therefore Is tnat direct legal controls 1n recent years have severely curtailed wage bargainmg The current econom1c depression and the threat of further legal control has in effect led to the dem1se of trad1t1onal un1on activity 1n th•s area_ While this IS true speci· fically of New Zealand. it IS suggested 1n this paper that, to the extent that compre~ hensive Government control over econom1c act1v1ty 1s rapidly becoming a permanent feature in all developed nations. so too is the ability of unions and employers to determine their own destiny in the settling Df wage rates restricted Wage controls were not the only threat to union activity in New Zealand in recent years. The increasing militancy of unions 1n the late 1960's and through the 1970's also Inspired a reaction from the National Government, which had been re-elected at the end of 1975, in the form of the intra· duct1on of severe anti-strike measures. The Labour Government, whtch had held political power in the preceding three years, had llberalised stnke laws in 1973 to g1ve umons greater legal freedom to take industrial act1on. In 1976 however, the National Government introduced an amending Bill to the existing legislation contain1ng what were described by some as the toughest and most repressive anti-strike measures known in the world The Bill was referred to a Parliamentary select committee to hear limited submissions from Interested parties but the measures were eventually enacted. Oddly, not all of the changes were enacted as amendments to the Industrial Relations Act: some of the provisions were tagged on to the Commerce Amend~ ment 8111 that was also before Parliament at that lime Labour's failure to halt the decline In New Zealand's economy saw a National which was not a dispute over an mdustnat matter, or whtch the employers and workers, or their respective untons, did not have the power to settle by agreement, or whtch was mtended to coerce the New Zealand Government (1n a capacity other than that of employer) etlher d~rectly or by mfilctmg tnconventence upon the commumty. Thts provtston was atmed at what were called pollltcal stnkes and was a dtrect sequel to the taktng of mdustrial action by a number of untons 1n protest agamst tne berthmg at New Zealand ports of Amencan nuclear war ships at the tnvitation of the New Zealand Government. The section, apart from makmg such actton an offence, also provtded that any person suffenng or apprehendmg loss as a result of such actton was able to obtam any or all of the remedtes available in civil proceedmgs to the same extent as if the stnke or lock-out were a tort mdependently of the seclton (provtded only that no award of damages could be made against an mdtvtdual) . A further sectton in the Commerce Amendment Act gave the Arbitration Court the power to order that full work be resumed where the public interest was affected as a result of industrial action. The sectton reqUired that the Court must make an order where it was satisfied that etther the economy of New Zealand (includmg m parttcular 1ts export trade) or the economy of a partiCU lar tndustry or mdustnes was or would be in the tmmedlate future substantially affected or, alternatively, 1f the life, safety or health of members of the communtty was endangered . The Court was also gtven power to determine a procedure for the settlement of the issue of the stnke or loc k-out and also to order the taktng of any necessary measures for the safety and health of workers concerned directly or tnd~rectly in the dispute. Finally, the Court was empowered to make orders for the cessation of any industrial action in the nature of a rollmg strike. Fatlure to comply with any order of the Court constituted an offence and 1n particular a breach of an order by a unton conferred a related liability on any members of the management committee of the union who wilfully failed to inform any worker bound by the order that fatlure to comply with it was declared "n offence
The power given to the Court to order resumption of work appears to have been modelled on the cooling off provisions initially enacted in the United States and later provided in the United Kingdom Industrial Relations Act of 1971. It will be recalled that, shortly after the latter provision was enacted, the Secretary of State applied to the United Kingdom Industrial Relations Court and obtained an order requiring striktng railway workers to resume work.S That action was then followed by a further application to the Court requiring a compulsory ballot of the railway workers, the result of which was a declaration of overwhelming support for the union's action In recommending the strlke.e
In New Zealand an application for a resumption of work order Is able to be made by any Minister of the Crown, any person who proves to the Court that he Is directly affected by the strike or lock-out or by any organisation representing any person so affected. The first application to be made to the Court for such an order was made by an organisation called "Strike Free" which, led by a law student who had previously successfully obtained an injunction In the Supreme Court against striking bus drivers, held itself out as being a public interest group dedicated to eradicating and eliminating strikes from the country. Strike Free sought an order in respect of a freezing works stoppage that was occurring at the time, notwithstanding the fact that negotiations were well advanced for the settlement of the dispute. The Court refused to give an early fixture for the hearing of the application "nd, by the time it was heard , the strike had been concluded Strike Free nevertheless asked the Court to make an order on the grounds that the strike might reoccur The Court In turn invtted counsel for Strike Free to withdraw the application and, when on Instructions that invitation was rejected, the Court dlsmtssed the application with a heavy order for costs against the organisation The view was also expressed obiter that it was doubtful whether an organisation of this kind came within the category of organlsattons which by the Act were empowered to make such applications.
The legislative measures enacted In the last two years in New Zealand represent deliberate Government policy that indus· trial disputes and clatms should be dealt with totally within the industrial framework provided by law and that uncontrolled direct bargaining or Ind ustri al action should be restricted so far as possible. The employers associations have not been slow to react to this development and have extended considerably the advocacy services which they provide for their members There has thus quickly grown up a large body of full time paid employer advocates {not necessarily lawyers) who assume representation of employers 1n disputes and claims heard by the Arbitration Court and before Conciliation Councils in the great majority of such cases. This development has not been without its difficulties, not the least of wh1ch has been the emergence In some instances of an incipient conflict of interest between the interests of the Individual employer and the collective interests of the employers· federation or association as a whole
There has been no comparable development on the union side to the increase in judicial determination of disputes and claims. New Zealand unions by and large are not wealthy and union secretanes traditionally have been paid very small salaries and been largely unass1sted by qualified staff. With one or two exceptions. the standard of union advocacy has therefore tended to be low This has given employers an edge in the tightened legal system that now exists. It is ot interest that the present Government 1n another context has recently suggested that there may be a need for State advocacy services to represent workers who are not unionlsed or adequately represented otherwise This suggestion has naturally met strong opposition from the unions who of course see it as an alternative to their own exist-
THE EROSION OF MANAGERIAL PREROGATIVE
Historically employers have claimed certain basic and inalienable rights, includIng the right to hire and fire at will, the right to determine and organise systems of work, the right to direct producllon. the right to determine company policies relatIng to production, marketing, investment and so forth and the right to maintain confidential knowledge on financial and 102 account1ng matters relating to the company's performance. In North Amenca such nghts have often been specifically preserved by provisions to that effect wntten into labour contracts. These rights are however currently under challenge by un10ns and workers tn many countries around the world In New Zealand the right to hire and ftre at will has already been subJected to legislative control At common law the worker who was dismissed had no remedy provided that he was g•ven due notice or paid in lieu of notice as required by taw The period of such notice was generally small and an employer was under no obligation to provide reasons for the dismissal An amendment to the New Zealand Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act in 1970 however introduced a standard personal grievance procedure wh1ch was required to be inserted into all awards and registered collective agreements. The procedure could be invoked by a worker who had been unJustifiably dismissed or otherw1se treated 1n a way to h1s detriment by action that was not common to other workers. The worker in the first instance had the right to take the matter up with his immediate supervisor with the intention that the dispute or grievance should be settled as quickly and as near to 1ts ong1n as possible In the event that the matter was not settled in that way, the worker wac; required to report it to his union which could if it chose take it up with the employer If no settlement was reached at that stage. then the union could require the establishment of a grievance committee consisting of an equal number of representatives from each side cha1red by an independent conciliator (normally in practice a full time paid officIal employed through lhe Labour Department) . Failing settlement, the matter could then be referred to the Arbitration Court which had power to order reinstatement of the employee and/or compensation, Including the Joss of any wages that may have been suffered
In praclice this procedure has served to remove dismissal disputes from the area of strike action so that again legal procedures.
Institutions and precedents are mcreasingly playing a dominant part In the conduct of a particular area of industrial relations Employer or managerial prerogative In the other areas referred to currently rema1ns intact 1n New Zealand although murmurings from the unions are rising. In particular, overseas trends towards greater worker participation 1n company decision-making and the recent Bullock Report in the United Kingdom on Industrial Democracy, including as 1t does recommendations for lhe appointment of worker representatives on directors boards, is forcing unions in New Zealand to reassess their traditional stance in these areas.
It should not necessarily be assumed however that the unions will wholeheartedly welcome such movements towards worker participation Overseas experience ol union or worker representatives appointed to the boards of compames has sometimes highlighted a conflict of loyalty and duty that can hamper such representatives. Many of the more militant umons perhaps feel that they stand to do better out of an arms length or adversary situation than they do from one where the exhortation is to work together towards a so-called common goal Further, authority of the union over the workers 1n a particular plant or enterprise may be undermined if the workers !hamselves are integrated into the company structure and take an active part in the decision making within that company . When productivity bargaining became popular in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in the 1960's union reaction ultimately became hostile because of this very factor.
The prognos1s for ga1ns in th1s area through union action may therefore not be wholly optimistic. It can consequently be predicted that in the long run there is likely to be greater change through legislation than by union agitation or bargaining . A lead already exists in this respect in certain western countries, notably those of Central and Northern Europe. The German systems of worker co-determination and the effect that they have had on company structures and managerial processes are well known and need not be traversed here. In a less drastic form a recently enacted Norwegian statute may provide a guide to what could occur in New Zealand and in other countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom
The Worker Protection and Working Environment Act of 1977 imposes certain positive obligations on Norwegian employers to organise systems of work which will a1d the employees' opportunities for selfdetermination and professional respo nsibility and which will avoid exposure of employees to undesirable physical or mental strain. Undiversifieci repetitive work and work that is governed by machine or contveyor belt in a manner in which the employees themselves are prevented from varying the speed of the work Is also specifically prohibited.
If in time comprehensive legislation Is enacted providing institutional or structural change to companies and requiring a degree of worker participation and Integratio n Into the policy or decision making areas of a company's activities, It would seem al most inevitable that the Industrial role of trade unions as it now exists will be threatened As indicated above and without necessarily claiming that unions are inherently antagonistic or unco-operative in their dealings with employers, their traditional stance nevertheless has been one of negotiation from an arms length position . Inevitably this has meant there has been an in-built element of conflict in employer/union relationships. The concept of joint decision making runs against this trait. Similarly, trade union officials have been the representatives of the worker members of their unions. While of course they derive their authority to act from the membership, nevertheless the conduct of negotiations and the decisions as to tactics and other matters of strategy have been taken by the union officials. This is the job of course that they are employed to do. Worker participation however involves the workers themselves in the particular factory or enterprise taking a part with the managers in the decisions that are to be taken for the common good. The roles of the outside union officials are clearly limited In such circumstances, as was the case in company productivity bargaining and Implementation What then would be the place of trade unions if systems of worker participation became widespread and indeed mandatory as a result of legislation? I suggest that the role of trade unions (and their counterpart employers' organisations) in the field of industrial relations would largely cease to exist and would be replaced by enterpnse or factory based representative committees or groups which might or might not have some allegiance to Industry councils consistmg of representatives from I different factories and formed more for the purpose of the exchange of information rather than for the purpose of representation as It presently exists. Unions as such may well survive but with more restricted functions of a social or co-operative kind. Certainly, in my view, their Industrial role and strength will be dissipated as worker rrghts and benefits are increasingly settled by legislation and through enterprise systems of JOint worker-employer decisionmaking.
The right s and entitlements of workers will therefore become the product of the State, exercising powers of patronage, 104 which might be extended or withheld at will. This Is not necessarily to say that any such development, with the attendant bene--fits that might result, should not be encouraged in the absence of effective union action . However any decline in trade union Industrial power will have a correspondmg effect on the considerable political strength of the unions as one of the counterbalancing forces that offset Governmental or State power. Any resultant increase in the political ability of the State to pass new laws to achieve its policy obJectives will accordIngly have significance from the wider perspective of the rule of law as It operates In a Parliamentary democracy.
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